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I. INTRODUCTION
The question we address in this paper is whether the investment spending of at
least some firms is affected by the availability of internally generated finance
(retained earnings), reflecting some constraint on the ability of these firms to
raise external finance (debt or new equity) for investment. The opposing view is
that the cost at which investment funds can be obtained, taken to be independent
of the amount invested, is the only financial consideration that matters in the
determination of investment.
This is an old question in economics, which has been the subject of several
official inquiries
2 as well as a large body of academic research. The answer to
this question has a number of important implications. Profits are highly cyclical,
so if investment depends directly on the availability of profits then investment
spending will be more sensitive to fluctuations in economic activity than would
otherwise be the case. This could be an important factor in the propagation of
business cycles. If post-tax profits help to determine investment spending then
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the impact of company taxes on investment will be more complicated than is
often assumed. In particular, the average tax rate will influence the level of
investment spending, in addition to the impact of taxes on the cost of capital, and
any increase in the total revenue raised from corporation tax could have a
directly adverse impact on business investment.
3 There may also be an incentive
for firms with available internal funds to take over firms whose investment
spending is constrained, resulting in take-over activity that would otherwise be
inefficient. To the extent that financial constraints on investment spending are
attributable to imperfections in capital markets or to market failures, there may
also be some motivation for policy measures designed to reduce these impacts, if
financial constraints are found to be pervasive.
4
Twenty years ago the mainstream answer to this question in the economics
literature was that the availability of internal finance did not matter for
investment. As a matter of theory, the level of investment was determined in a
well-functioning capital market. The price at which firms could obtain funds for
investment was therefore the only relevant financial consideration. In particular,
companies with opportunities for profitable investment spending that exceeded
their available cash flow would not be expected to invest any less than firms
with the same opportunities and higher cash flow — any shortfall would easily
attract funding in the capital market as investors sought to exploit the
opportunity for profit. It was recognised that the model of a ‘well-functioning’
capital market neglected any taxes or transaction costs that might make one
source of finance more expensive than another, and also neglected any
differences in the information available to decision- makers within the firm and
to potential outside investors. But departures from this model were not
considered to be important.
Most of the empirical evidence available at the time did not seem to
contradict this view. Most econometric studies used time-series data on the
aggregate investment spending of the manufacturing sector or of the company
sector as a whole. This evidence appeared to indicate that the level of output,
proxying for the level of demand, was the key determinant of the capital stock
desired by firms, and hence of investment spending. Surveying this literature in
1971, Dale Jorgenson concluded that ‘variables associated with internal finance
do not appear as significant determinants of desired capital in any model that
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also includes output as a significant determinant’ (Jorgenson, 1971).
5 Moreover,
any influence found from profits or other financial indicators could also be
dismissed as merely helping to proxy better for the influence of (expected)
demand.
Over the last twenty years, and particularly during the last decade, there has
been a breakdown in this consensus view. This is related to both theoretical and
empirical developments. On the theoretical side, research into the behaviour of
markets characterised by imperfect information restored respectability to the idea
that investment finance may only be available on less favourable terms in the
external capital market, or indeed may not be available at all in some cases. This
idea that external sources of finance may be more expensive than internal
sources underpins the hierarchy of finance (or ‘pecking order’) approach to
corporate finance. An implication of this model is that the investment spending
of some firms may be constrained by a shortage of internal funds, in a sense
which will be made more precise below.
6
More recent empirical evidence from microeconometric studies, using data
on individual firms, has also suggested that cash flow has a significant impact on
company investment spending. This research has made a more serious attempt to
distinguish the effect of high current profits in relaxing financial constraints
from the effect of high current profits on expectations of future profitability than
was possible in the earlier work. Moreover, the evidence for cash-flow effects on
investment has been found to be concentrated among sub-samples of firms where
the hierarchy of finance approach predicts the incidence of financial constraints
to be more likely. Although not wholly convincing, these results have cast doubt
on the earlier consensus view. They are also consistent with the results of
surveys such as the CBI Industrial Trends Survey, which consistently indicates
that a shortage of internal finance is perceived to be a significant factor limiting
the capital expenditure of many firms.
7
This paper will briefly review the implications for investment of this
hierarchy of finance model and some of the recent empirical evidence that
appears to support it. We will also describe our own econometric research, using
data for some 626 large UK firms over the period 1971–86, which indicates the
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presence of significant financial constraints on investment in the UK corporate
sector.
II. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS IN THE HIERARCHY OF FINANCE
MODEL
The hierarchy of finance approach to corporate finance starts from the
assumption that external finance, from either debt or new share issues, may be
more expensive than internal finance from retained profits. In the US, this
assumption can be motivated by differences in the tax treatment of dividend
income and of capital gains. For most taxpayers, dividend income is taxed more
heavily than capital gains, so that shareholders pay less tax when dividend
payments are kept to a minimum. This makes retained earnings (i.e. lower
dividends) the tax-efficient source of investment finance.
In the UK, this appeal to tax distortions alone to explain the lower cost of
internal finance would be less convincing, since different groups of shareholders
face different tax incentives. Under the imputation relationship between personal
and corporate taxes that has operated since 1973, only higher-rate taxpayers
would have a tax preference for retained profits over new share issues; and tax-
exempt institutions like pension funds would find it tax-efficient for profits to be
paid out as dividends.
8
Nevertheless it has been noted that patterns of corporate finance in the UK
are similar to those found in the US. Around two-thirds of investment is financed
from retained earnings and under 10 per cent is financed from new share issues.
9
One possibility is that high transaction costs associated with placing new shares
are sufficient to outweigh the tax advantage for most companies. Another
possibility is that asymmetric information between insiders in the firm and
potential outside investors results in a higher cost for external sources of funds.
The basic idea is similar to that used to explain the rapid depreciation in the
second-hand value of cars once they leave the dealer’s showroom. Less well-
informed subscribers to new issues of equity or debt (cf. used car buyers)
demand a discount to compensate for the risk that the firm seeking finance (cf.
used car sellers) knows that it is currently overvalued. The result is that firms
raising external finance have to pay this premium, making external funds more
costly than internal funds. In some cases the investors may be unwilling to lend
to the firm on any terms, resulting in credit rationing.
10
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For one or more of these reasons, the hierarchy of finance approach assumes
that internal finance is significantly cheaper than external finance, and is
therefore used in preference to the extent that it is available. To see the
consequences for investment spending, it is simplest to consider a firm that has
no access to debt finance and is thus choosing between retained profits and new
shares only. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The required rate of return rR
shows the cost of finance from retained earnings, whilst the higher required rate
of return rN shows the cost of finance from new share issues. The downward-
sloping lines labelled D1, D2 and D3 illustrate three possible positions for a line
describing the investment opportunities available to the firm (i.e. the rate of
return on investment projects that can be earned). The level of investment
spending Ī shows the maximum level of investment that the firm can finance
from its internal sources. It should be noted that this level need not correspond to
the point at which dividend payments have been reduced to zero. It is often
suggested that dividend payments are ‘sticky’, at least downwards.
11 he
investment level Ī can be thought of as the point where the firm is unwilling to
cut its dividend payments any further. Note that this level will be positively
related to the cash flow generated from the firm’s existing activities.
FIGURE 1
The Hierarchy of Finance Model with No Debt Finance
For a firm whose profitable investment opportunities are low relative to its
cash flow, the position of the investment demand curve will be like that
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illustrated as D1. Such a firm can finance all its desired investment from retained
profits and still pay out relatively high dividends. Investment spending would be
at the level I1, and is not affected by fluctuations in cash flow around the level
corresponding to Ī. We call this position Regime 1.
A similar result is found for firms whose profitable investment opportunities
are very high relative to their cash flow. This position is illustrated by the
investment demand curve D3. Such firms have sufficiently attractive investment
projects that they find it worthwhile issuing new shares, despite the extra cost.
Their investment would be at the level I3, and is again unaffected by fluctuations
in cash flow around the level corresponding to Ī. We call this Regime 3, which is
characterised by relatively low or zero dividends and the issue of new shares.
Financial constraints affect the investment spending of firms in the
intermediate position, illustrated by the investment opportunities line D2. These
firms have sufficiently attractive investment opportunities that they exhaust all
their internal sources of funds available for investment. However, their
remaining projects are not so attractive that they would choose to issue new
shares, given the higher rate of return required. Their investment spending is
thus constrained to the level Ī that can be financed from retained profits. We call
this Regime 2, characterised by relatively low or zero dividends but no issue of
new shares.
The investment of firms in Regime 2 can be described as financially
constrained in the following sense. A windfall increase in cash flow that conveys
no new information about the firm’s investment opportunities would produce an
increase in investment spending. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the outward
shift in the level of investment that can be financed internally, from Ī to Ī´. For
firms in Regime 2, this results in a corresponding increase in investment, as the
firm moves down the demand curve D2. Note that the investment spending of
these firms is limited by the availability of internal finance, even though they
have access to new equity finance at the cost rN.
12 he investment of firms in
Regimes 1 and 3 is not constrained in this sense. Nor would any firms be subject
to financial constraints if there was no difference between the cost of external
and internal funds — this is the assumption that underlies the traditional
consensus view described in the introduction.
These implications for investment are not greatly affected by the possibility
of using debt rather than new equity as a source of external finance, provided
that the effective cost of borrowing rises as the firm borrows more. This does not
merely mean that the interest rate charged on loans to the firm goes up with the
level of borrowing: the rate of interest charged to the firm will generally go up as
the probability of default increases, to compensate lenders for the risk of
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receiving less than the contracted repayment in the event that the firm does
default. But the fact that the firm pays out less in this case shows that the
expected cost of repaying the loan, averaged across outcomes where the firm
defaults as well as those where it does not, is not necessarily higher. An
increasing effective cost of borrowing requires that this expected cost of repaying
the debt goes up as the firm borrows more.
There are several reasons why the effective cost of borrowing will increase
with the risk of default and therefore with the level of borrowing. Most
straightforwardly, there are direct costs associated with bankruptcy proceedings
that are only paid in the event that a default occurs. These costs will fall on
borrowers rather than lenders, in the form of an interest rate schedule that gives a
rising effective cost of borrowing, since lenders have alternative investment
opportunities that involve no (or lower) bankruptcy risk. There are also indirect
costs of bankruptcy, such as the loss of value of intangible assets including
goodwill, brand names and reputation for quality, which may be quantitatively
more significant. There may also be a risk premium reflecting asymmetric
information between lenders and borrowers that becomes more important as the
probability of default increases.
The situation where the firm has access to debt finance with an increasing
effective cost of borrowing is illustrated in Figure 2. Here the level of investment
Ī shows the maximum level that can be financed before internal funds are
exhausted, given that the optimal borrowing policy is used.
13 For firms in
Regimes 1 and 3, the implications are unchanged from the no-debt case, except
that firms in Regime 1 may use some debt as well as retentions to finance their
investment and firms in Regime 3 may issue debt as well as new shares.
For firms that exhaust their internal funds but do not issue new shares, the
position is somewhat more complex although the implications remain similar.
These firms are no longer constrained to the level of investment spending given
by Ī. They can finance higher investment by (further) borrowing to the extent
that they find it worthwhile to bear the increasing cost.
14 In this case, their
investment is determined by the rising cost of debt that they face, giving the level
I2. Nevertheless they are still financially constrained in the sense defined above.
A windfall increase in cash flow allows levels of investment above Ī to be
financed at lower levels of borrowing. This reduces the effective cost of debt at
each investment level, resulting in higher investment at I2
´. As before, the capital
expenditure of firms in this position is limited by the availability of internal
finance, even though they have access to external capital markets.
                                                                                                                                   
13 Debt may of course be cheaper than finance from retained earnings at low levels of borrowing, as a result of
the tax advantage associated with interest deductibility against corporation tax. Firms in Regime 1 may use a
combination of retentions and debt, with the optimal borrowing policy reflecting a trade-off between the tax
advantage and the dead-weight costs of bankruptcy.
14 The situation illustrated in Figure 2 assumes that these firms do not encounter credit rationing, although this
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This conclusion would apply a fortiori if these firms did in fact also face
credit rationing. The only case where debt finance would eliminate financial
constraints  on investment  is that where  debt  provides  a  perfect  substitute  for
FIGURE 2
The Hierarchy of Finance Model with Debt Finance
retained profits. This only occurs when the firm has access to unlimited levels of
debt finance at the same effective cost as the required rate of return on
retentions. In this case, investment spending would again be independent of any
financial consideration other than this cost, as in the classic Modigliani–Miller
theorem (see Modigliani and Miller (1958)).
The possibility that financially constrained firms in Regime 2, facing a
hierarchy of costs for different sources of finance, could account for empirical
evidence that company investment tends to be excessively sensitive to cash flow
was suggested by Hayashi (1985a). Econometric studies that investigate this idea
further are described in Section IV. We first review the problem of
distinguishing the influence of high cash flow on firms’ expectations of future
profitability from its effect in relaxing financial constraints on investment. In the
context of Figures 1 and 2, this corresponds to identifying the effect of financial
constraints separately from shifts in the position of the investment demand curve
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III. THE ROLE OF CASH FLOW IN DIFFERENT ECONOMETRIC
MODELS OF INVESTMENT
Traditional econometric models of investment were not really able to distinguish
between these two possible influences of cash flow on investment. However, the
distinction is crucial for answering the question posed at the start of this paper. A
correlation between investment and cash flow does not establish that investment
spending is constrained by the availability of internal funds: a rise in current
cash flow may just signal higher future profitability.
The optimal capital stock at some point in time can be thought of as the level
where the marginal product of capital is equal to the user cost of capital.
15 If the
capital stock were lower then further investment would be profitable, but
increasing the capital stock beyond this level would not be profitable. This
optimal stock of capital can generally be related to the current level of output
and the user cost of capital.
Investment is likely to depend not only on the current level of the optimal
capital stock, but also on the levels of the capital stock that the firm expects will
be optimal in the future. In particular, the short-run response of capital to
fluctuations in demand or costs is likely to be incomplete and dependent on how
permanent the change in output or user cost is perceived to be.
This dependence of investment decisions on expected future levels of output
and the user cost of capital presents a major problem for econometric investment
models, since data on firms’ expectations are not generally available. Traditional
econometric models typically related investment to both current and lagged
values of output and the user cost. Models of this type do not distinguish
between those factors that directly influence the optimal capital stock and other
variables that help to forecast the future values of these factors. Financial
variables could appear to be significant merely if they helped to forecast future
output, for example. Thus the addition of profits or cash flow to these
econometric models does not properly test the idea that financial constraints
affect investment spending. Significant coefficients on cash-flow terms could
reflect either financial constraints or expectations formation.
In the last decade, more structural investment models have been proposed
which attempt to get around this identification problem, and these models have
generally been adopted in the literature that tests for financial constraints.
16 The
best-known model is the Q model, which develops the idea that firms face
(strictly convex) costs of adjustment when changing the level of the capital
stock. Costs of adjustment could reflect planning or installation costs, or
                                                                                                                                   
15 The concept of the user cost of capital was developed by Jorgenson (1963). This can be thought of as the
minimum rate of return an investment project must earn before the firm considers it to be attractive. This
depends on rates of interest, inflation and depreciation, as well as on taxes. See Bond, Denny and Devereux
(1993) for a recent non-technical discussion.
16 See Blundell, Bond and Meghir (1992) and Chirinko (1993) for surveys of this recent literature.Fiscal Studies
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disruptions to the normal production process as new capital equipment is
incorporated.
The resulting model relates investment to the ratio between the market value
of the firm’s existing capital stock and the current cost of replacing that capital
stock. This ratio is known as the Q ratio. The basic intuition is that an investment
project that adds more to the firm’s market value than it costs to undertake will
be profitable, and profitable investment opportunities will be higher when the
firm’s actual capital stock is below its optimal capital stock. Investment is
therefore likely to be higher when the market valuation of the firm’s capital is
high relative to its replacement cost.
Although this model assumes that investment decisions are forward-looking
and dependent on expectations of future profitability, the theory implies that
there should be a simple relationship between the current rate of investment and
the Q ratio. The market value of the firm’s capital stock can in principle be
estimated by combining the stock-market value of the company with estimates of
the market value of the firm’s debt liabilities and other assets. Expectations of
future profitability are therefore ‘measured’ in this model by the forward-looking
stock-market valuation. Under certain rather stringent conditions, it can be
shown that the Q variable summarises all expectations that are relevant for
investment behaviour.
17
The advantage of this approach is that if these conditions are satisfied then
the effect of cash-flow or profitability variables on expectations of future
demand or costs should already be captured by the Q ratio. If it is found that
such financial variables are significant determinants of investment in addition to
the measure of Q, then it may be more reasonable to infer that these terms are
really picking up the influence of financial constraints.
Unfortunately the problem remains of not really being sure that these
conditions are satisfied in practice. For example, it is often suggested that stock-
market prices are ‘too noisy’ or that they display excessive volatility relative to
the fundamental value of companies.
18 If this were the case then measures of Q
would be subject to error, and current financial variables like cash flow may
provide additional information about the true value of this ratio. In this case, we
are back to the problem of disentangling expectational effects from the effects of
financial constraints.
An alternative approach exploits a relationship between investment rates in
successive periods that is implied by the costs of adjustment model. In particular,
it can be shown that the current rate of investment will be positively related to
the rate of investment that is expected for the next period and to the deviation of
                                                                                                                                   
17 These requirements include perfect competition, constant returns to scale and, crucially, that the stock-
market value correctly measures the ‘fundamental’ expected present value of the firm’s future net cash flows.
The formal development of the model was due to Hayashi (1982).
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the current optimal capital stock (that the firm would choose in the absence of
adjustment costs) from the current actual capital stock. These two terms
therefore reflect the same information as that contained in the true value of the Q
ratio. In this ‘Euler equation’, all relevant expectations are summarised by the
one-period- ahead forecast of the investment rate itself.
This expected investment rate cannot be directly measured, but because only
the one-period-ahead forecast is required, this expected value can be replaced by
the actual investment rate in the next period and a term that reflects the error
made in forecasting next period’s investment rate using the information available
in the current period. Under the conditions of perfect competition and constant
returns to scale used to obtain the Q model, the Euler equation can then be
rearranged to give an econometric model of investment which does not depend
on the assumption that share prices reflect only fundamentals. Letting It denote
the level of gross investment in period t, Kt denote the level of the actual capital
stock in period t, ∏ t denote the level of gross operating profits in period t, Jt
denote the user cost of capital in period t and vt +1 denote the forecast error, the
resulting investment model can be written as
19
(1)
Under constant returns to scale, the marginal product of capital can be
measured by the average profit term in equation (1). The term in square brackets
therefore measures the difference between the marginal product and the user cost
of capital, reflecting the deviation of the optimal capital stock from the current
actual level. The model is best interpreted as relating the current rate of
investment (I/K)t positively to next period’s rate of investment (I/K)t +1 and to
this average profit term.
20 The future investment term is taken to the left-hand
side purely for convenience in estimation, which accounts for the otherwise
puzzling negative sign on the average profit term.
This model has the advantage of controlling for the influence of expected
future profitability on investment spending, whilst not requiring an explicit
measure of expected demand or expected costs. In particular, there is no appeal
to the use of share prices to ‘measure’ these expectations. In our view, the Euler
equation approach, which imposes the weakest auxiliary assumptions to derive a
structural investment model from the adjustment costs framework, provides
                                                                                                                                   
19 See Bond and Meghir (1994) for details. The restrictive assumptions of perfect competition and constant
returns to scale can be relaxed. This approach to modelling investment was developed by Abel (1980) and is
closely related to the ‘random walk’ consumption model developed by Hall (1978).
20 The presence of the squared investment term reflects the assumed quadratic form of the adjustment cost
function, which is common to this and to the Q model.Fiscal Studies
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possibly the most convincing model currently available for testing the
importance of financial constraints on investment.
The model also suggests restrictions on the estimated parameters which are
useful in testing for financial constraints. In the absence of financial constraints,
it can be shown that the coefficient on the level of the current investment rate
(I/K)t should be positive and greater than one; the coefficient on the square of the
current investment rate should be negative and less than minus one; and the
coefficient on the gross operating profit term should be negative. If financial
constraints are important then the high correlation between gross operating profit
and measures of cash flow might be expected to reverse the predicted negative
coefficient on this last term.
21 More generally, other financial variables that may
help to predict which financial regime a firm is in, such as dividends and new
share issues, would then be expected to appear significant if added to the right-
hand side of equation (1). More fundamentally, if no firms are affected by
financial constraints then the investment behaviour of firms pursuing different
financial policies should be similar and characterised by the same estimated
coefficients in a model like equation (1). But if some firms do face financial
constraints then their investment behaviour will be different, and different
coefficients should be estimated for these firms.
 IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Several recent studies have estimated Q models of investment using panel data
for individual companies (i.e. repeated observations over time on the same
sample of firms). Two leading examples are the study by Hayashi and Inoue
(1991), which used data for 687 quoted Japanese manufacturing firms over the
period 1977–86, and that by Blundell, Bond, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1992),
which used data for 532 quoted UK manufacturing firms over the period 1971–
86. Both these studies found that a measure of cash flow had a positive and
highly significant effect on company investment, in addition to measured Q. This
finding is consistent with the hierarchy of finance approach, but does not test
that explanation for financial constraints directly. In particular, it might be
objected that measured Q provides a poor proxy for the firm’s investment
opportunities, and that these cash-flow terms simply provide additional
information about the expected profitability of investment.
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) provide a more direct test of the
hierarchy of finance explanation. They divide their sample of 422 US
manufacturing firms into sub-samples of those that tend to pay high dividends
and those that tend to pay low dividends, and estimate a separate Q investment
                                                                                                                                   
21 In particular, this will result when there are important financial constraints on investment in period t + 1,
given the high correlation between cash flow in period t + 1 and cash flow in period t.Financial Constraints and Company Investment
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equation for each sub- sample.
22 This reflects the idea that firms in Regime 1 of
the hierarchy of finance model, with sufficient internal funds to finance their
desired investment and therefore not subject to financial constraints, will tend to
pay relatively high dividends. Fazzari et al. find that cash flow is more
significant, and measured Q less significant, in the sub-sample that pays low
dividends, which is consistent with the prediction that financial constraints
should be more important for firms where internal funds are in short supply.
However, they also find that cash flow remains significant in addition to Q even
in the sub-sample paying high dividends.
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) use a similar approach, but they
divide a sample of Japanese companies into two groups according to whether the
firm has a close institutional relationship with a bank or not. The idea here is that
differences in the cost of internal and external finance resulting from asymmetric
information may be less important where the bank maintains a long-term
relationship with the firm. If this is so then financial constraints on investment
would be less important for these firms. Hoshi et al. find that cash flow is less
significant, and measured Q more significant, for the sub-sample of companies
that are closely related to a bank. However, they also reject the prediction that
cash flow contains no additional information for investment not summarised by
Q, even in this sub-sample of firms.
These findings provide some support for the hierarchy of finance model, but
do not completely overcome the objection that the Q ratio provides an
inadequate measure of expected profitability. If one is concerned that share
prices do not always provide an accurate measure of the fundamental value of a
firm, one might think that this problem is more likely to be important for firms
about which information is relatively scarce. This could also explain why Q
performs especially poorly, and other variables appear more important, in the
sub-sample of relatively young and small companies in the low-dividend group
of Fazzari et al. (1988) and in the group of firms not connected to banks in Hoshi
et al. (1991).
V. SOME NEW EVIDENCE FOR THE UK
In recent work using data for 626 quoted UK manufacturing firms over the
period 1971–86, we depart from this previous literature in two important
respects. First, we use the Euler equation model outlined above in preference to
the Q model of investment. Second, we test more directly the implications of the
hierarchy of finance model. Both the investment opportunities and the level of
                                                                                                                                   
22 This approach parallels that used in the microeconometric literature testing for liquidity constraints on
consumption, where samples are divided into high-wealth and low-wealth households. See Hayashi (1985b)
and Zeldes (1989). Fazzari et al. (1988) also estimate some traditional investment models on their sub-samples,
with similar findings to those from the Q model.Fiscal Studies
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profits for a given firm can fluctuate significantly over time. Thus the same firm
may be in Regime 1 in some periods, but in Regime 2 and subject to a financial
constraint on investment spending in other periods. Consequently we test
whether financial constraints appear to be more important in periods when a
given firm pays low dividends compared with its normal payout policy, rather
than in all periods for those firms that pay low dividends on average. This
approach allows for the possibility that more firms may be subject to financial
constraints in recessions, when internal funds are likely to be in short supply,
than in more prosperous periods.
The Euler equation is an intertemporal condition relating investment in two
successive periods. The model would only be unaffected by financial constraints
if the firm’s investment was unconstrained in both periods. We therefore
estimate a version of equation (1) in which the coefficients are allowed to take
different values for two groups of observations: those where the dividend payout
is high compared with the firm’s normal payout policy and no new shares are
issued, in both period t and period t + 1 (i.e. observations where the firm is likely
to be in Regime 1 in both periods);
23 and the group comprising all other
potentially constrained observations. Only one-third of the total observations are
allocated to the Regime 1 group by this criterion. If financial constraints on
investment are not important then we would expect similar coefficients to be
estimated for both groups of observations. Otherwise we would expect to find
different coefficients for the two groups, especially on the gross operating profits
term which is highly correlated with cash flow; and we would also expect that
other financial variables such as dividends and new share issues would contain
additional information about investment in the potentially constrained subgroup
but not in the Regime 1 observations.
Details of our sample, estimation method and results are reported in Bond
and Meghir (1994). Some of the key empirical results are presented here in
Table 1. Note that the estimated equations omit the user-cost-of-capital variable
that appears in equation (1), but include year dummies and firm-specific effects
which control for some of the variation in the user cost. They also contain
additional measures of real sales and debt, which control for monopolistic
product markets and an increasing effective cost of borrowing respectively.
The first column of Table 1 reports the results of estimating this model using
the full sample, with no allowance for different financial regimes. The estimated
coefficients on the level and the square of the current investment rate, (I/K)t, are
correctly signed, but the coefficient on the former is lower than would be
expected in the absence of financial constraints on investment. Moreover, the
estimated coefficient on the gross operating profits variable is incorrectly signed.
                                                                                                                                   
23 More precisely, we consider current dividends to be low when the ratio of dividends to capital stock falls
below three-quarters of the mean value of this ratio for the firm over the whole period. Alternative criteria for
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Probability that all coefficients are equal for the sub-samples = 0.009.
Probability that (Π /K)t coefficients are equal for the sub-samples = 0.003.
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The equations estimated are based on equation (1), as described in the text. Additional variables included are
year dummies, an output term and a debt term. The estimation allows for unobserved firm-specific effects.
Any bias due to the neglect of financial regimes is most likely to be manifested
in this coefficient. We also considered including additional financial variables in
the model, and found that both dividends and new share issues were significant
when the model was estimated using the full sample.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 report the coefficient estimates for the two sub-
samples of observations described above. Those in column 2 are for observations
with high dividends and no share issues in both periods, whilst those in column 3
are for the potentially constrained observations. The hypothesis that these two
sets of parameter estimates are equal is strongly rejected, and the difference is
most significant for the gross operating profits term. The coefficient on this term
is found to be significantly positive only for the observations where financial
constraints are likely to influence the results. The estimated coefficients on the
investment terms are also more reasonable for the Regime 1 sub-sample. When
we add dividends and new issues to the equation, they are found to be highly
significant for the potentially constrained observations but not for the Regime 1
observations.
These findings are inconsistent with the traditional consensus view that the
availability of internal finance is irrelevant for company investment. They are
consistent with the hierarchy of finance approach, and suggest that the
investment spending of a significant fraction of large UK corporations is likely
to be affected by the availability of internal finance.Fiscal Studies
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Taking our findings together with the existing empirical results summarised in
Section IV, it is clear that microeconometric evidence now casts considerable
doubt on the validity of the view that financial constraints on company
investment are unimportant.
We emphasise that it does not follow from this conclusion that there is a case
for government intervention in the allocation of investment finance. Financial
constraints on investment may be an unavoidable consequence of asymmetric
information between investors and firms. Any case for policy intervention, or for
reform of the financial system, would have to demonstrate not merely that
financial constraints have an adverse impact on investment under the current
system, but that their impact would be reduced by the proposed policy measure
or reform. A useful step in this direction would be to examine whether
differences in the characteristics of financial systems found in different
countries, or international differences in the pattern of investment finance used
by firms, are associated with any measurable differences in the impact of
financial constraints on company investment.
Serious consideration should, however, be given to the implications of
financial constraints for the impact of taxes on investment. There are at least two
further ways in which taxes may affect investment spending, over and above the
effect of taxes on the user cost of capital that is normally the focus of attention.
First, an increase in the effective average rate of tax on corporate profits
24
will reduce the investment spending of firms whose investment is limited by the
availability of internal finance, even if the user cost of capital is left unchanged.
For a given level of pre-tax profits, higher corporate taxes will shift the position
of Ī to the left in the context of Figures 1 and 2, and so may reduce investment,
even if they do not increase the required rates of return. The number of
companies affected, and hence the importance of this effect in aggregate, may
well vary over the cycle with the overall level of profitability.
Second, a tax regime that encourages high dividend payments could also
reduce the availability of internal finance for investment. A tax policy that
favours dividends but leaves the cost of capital unchanged has no implications
for investment according to the traditional view, since any investment that is not
financed from retained profits can equally well be financed from external
sources. However, encouraging dividend payments may be less benign when
external finance is not a perfect substitute for internal funds. For a given level of
profits and tax payments, this will also shift Ī to the left and reduce the
investment of some firms, if the more favourable tax treatment obliges firms to
pay out a higher share of profits as dividends to shareholders.
                                                                                                                                   
24 i.e. the share of profits paid to the Government in the form of corporate taxes.Financial Constraints and Company Investment
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Both these effects may be relevant in the UK context. They suggest that the
increase in the effective average tax rate on companies associated with the
reform of corporation tax in 1984,
25 and the favourable tax treatment of
dividends under the imputation system introduced in 1973, may both have had
adverse implications for the level of UK company investment.
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